'He utilized as well extensively invaluable Greek sources, the most important being the diary of the last grand marshal of the Court who illuminates the final phase of the Greek monarchy before its abolition in 1973.'


'US Intelligence and Chinese Spies in the civil war'

Journal of Intelligence History, 2013

Throughout the civil war, US intelligence in China reported on the operations of the Bureau of Information and Statistics (BIS) of the regime of the Kuomintang (KMT) – the ruling Chinese National People’s Party of the Republic of China – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Soviet intelligence (the NKVD – later the MBG and its military intelligence counterpart the GRU) in the vast urban centres of Shanghai, Nanjing, Tietsin and Beijing, as well as in key ports and coastal cities. Opponents multiplied in the complex and ruthless world of espionage, and honest allies were hard to find. The descendant of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), the X-2 Branch (the surviving counter-intelligence branch of the OSS), Army and Naval Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and ultimately, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were the key agencies handling secret human sources, witnessing the rapid decay of the KMT regime, the performance of its security apparatus, and the PLA’s secret activities among the urban population. US intelligence also noted the extensive recruitment of Japanese intelligence networks and operators to serve the Soviets, the KMT regime and the Communist Party of China (CPC); only a couple of years earlier Japanese spies were the enemy, and now they were deemed expert intelligence assets, to be employed without hesitation. One could say that in espionage yesterday’s fanatical enemy is tomorrow’s unscrupulous associate.


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'The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: International Reactions, Military Intelligence and British Diplomacy'

Middle Eastern Studies Vol.48, No.4, July 2012

From the outset the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was strongly condemned by Britain and all the other NATO member states, by the non-aligned group and by key countries in Asia and the Middle East. During the first days following the invasion, London worked for the speedy build-up of a diplomatic consensus, while the Carter administration was still in a state of surprise and some confusion. It is evident that the single factor that led many countries to join forces diplomatically was the fear of further Soviet adventurism in Asia and the Middle East; uninformed, alarmist assessments of Soviet intentions played a major part in cementing a diplomatic coalition, which led to the condemnation of Moscow in the UN General Assembly – predictably, the Soviets had vetoed a Security Council resolution. Simply put, the fear of war led to something of a panic among non-aligned nations, which in turn convinced them to back western diplomacy.


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'British Diplomacy and the decline of CENTO'

Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28.4.

The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) is considered the failed west-inspired alliance of the Cold War that was dissolved in 1979 after the fall of the Shah. Britain found the regional members states, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, unwilling to focus on a common deterrent strategy or assign forces to this alliance. Pakistan wanted to turn CENTO against India, but London resisted any policy that could offend New Delhi. Eventually Whitehall admitted that this organization was nothing more than 'a paper tiger' and, in accordance with the 1974 Defence Review, opted for military disengagement from the alliance. British policy was based on a realist estimate: CENTO did not face the prospect of Russian aggression. Furthermore, no military contingency planning existed for the co-operation of CENTO with NATO.


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'The Value to CENTO of UK Bases on Cyprus'

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.45, No.4, July 2009.

The British sovereign bases on Cyprus, granted with the 1960 treaty establishing the Republic of Cyprus, played a key role in maintaining the fragile military structure of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Although Britain and the United States urged the alliance to play a more active role, CENTO degenerated into an organization with no assigned forces with the exception of RAF bombers carrying nuclear weapons, stationed on Cyprus. Thus, Britain's contribution in political and military terms became vital for CENTO's deterrence capability. The Shah of Iran, one of the key regional leaders, was interested in the RAF bombers on Cyprus; the FCO and the MoD were always cautious in how force restructuring would be presented to the Iranians. Eventually, the need to cut defence spending for non-NATO purposes forced Whitehall to withdraw its bombers based in Cyprus in 1975. Britain could not be the only power paying for this alliance. In 1976, Whitehall started scaling down financial support of military exercises and by 1983 they had planned to spend nil on the alliance. The British policy of disengagement proved the correct one since this alliance had only a few years of life left. After the fall of the Shah, CENTO collapsed in 1979.


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'The 1978 Battle of Larnaca Airport,
Cyprus and UK Diplomacy'

Middle East Review of International Affairs,
Vol. 13, No.2, June 2009.

In the long history of terrorism usually a group confronted government forces or set off bombs. However, in 1978 two countries clashed while the terrorists held up hostages in a nearby airplane. The Cypriot government under President Spyros Kyprianou who handled personally the negotiations with Arab terrorists faced an Egyptian crack anti-terrorist group. The troops attempted to free the hostages without the authorization of Kyprianou. The Egyptians aiming for an Entebbe-style operation met the determined Cypriot National Guard who opened fire against them killing fifteen commandos and destroying their C-130H transport in a fifty-minute battle at the airport of Larnaca. The government of Cyprus was willing to show the world that they defended their sovereignty even at the cost of being viewed of negotiating with terrorists and defeating an anti-terrorist unit. British diplomats assessed the unfolding crisis minute by minute and provided a balanced account.


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'The Special Operations Executive
and Cyprus in the Second World War'

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.45, No.2, March 2009.

Cyprus, together with Gibraltar and Malta constituted the crown jewels of British sea power in the Mediterranean during the Second World War. Being deployed on Cyprus the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force could fight the Germans and Italians in the Southeast Mediterranean, thus inhibiting the continuous supply of troops and war material to the Africa Corps of Field Marshall Ervin Rommel. This article aims to shed light on the activities of the Special Operations Executive on the island. Citing recently declassified files, the article assesses the espionage and propaganda as well as the guerilla warfare contingencies in case of an Axis invasion of Cyprus. It also provides a critical assessment of the British guerilla warfare strategy arguing that the SOE and the 25th Army Corps based on Cyprus had not been well prepared to counter aggression due to inter-service rivalries, bad planning and lack of man power. Besides, the SOE distrusted the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots to the extent that the training of guerillas was planned to commence only after a successful invasion and the occupation of the island. Finally, SOE officers considered the Cypriot communists with their anti-colonialist declarations as another threat to be confronted by special operations.


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'Intelligence for Crisis Management: the case
of the January 1996 Greek-Turkish Crisis'

European Security, Vol.17, No.4, 2008.

Until today, the January 1996 Greek-Turkish crisis over the sovereignty status of two Southeast Aegean islets remains one of the most serious episodes of Greek-Turkish antagonism. The author assesses the role of Greek military intelligence during the crisis arguing that Hellenic intelligence did not anticipate a confrontation with Turkey over the two uninhabited islets. Eventually, the MoD mobilised a disproportionate number of ships in the Aegean to defend Greek sovereignty over the Imia islets. As the crisis unfolded, the Greek prime minister became frustrated by the inability of Greek intelligence services to confirm a Turkish landing on the second Imia islet. The author shows that during the crisis hours of 31 January 1996, the lack of tactical intelligence on Turkish deployment had a direct impact on the assessment of the operational status of the Greek armed forces and on the planned crisis response. Ultimately, rather than causing an acute sense of vulnerability, fear, and an aggressive response, the lack of intelligence led to a de-escalation of the crisis.


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'British Intelligence
and the Cyprus Insurgency, 1955-1959'

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
Vol.21, No.2, Spring 2008.

The 1950s anti-colonial insurgency in Cyprus shaped considerably the question over the island. This article shows that British intelligence services had very good and precise information on the EOKA organisation, methods, tactics and operations. However, until 1959, Georgios Grivas was kept safe and continued leading the EOKA, while suffering casualties in the ranks of lieutenants. Eventually, on the eve of the signing of the London agreement, British intelligence was directed from London not to arrest Grivas, who had been located hiding in Limassol. Secret intelligence was made redundant; it could not contribute to British interests since the Anglo-Greek-Turkish agreement was about to be reached; it was time for diplomacy and not continuing counterinsurgency. Intelligence gathering does not have 'all the time in the world'. It operates under political guidelines depending on the overall international diplomacy environment.


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'Greek Military Intelligence
and the Italian Threat, 1934-1940'

Journal of Intelligence History, Vol.7, No.1, Summer 2007.

Prior to the Second World War, Greek military intelligence played a significant role in warning the Greek administration of Italian deployments in Albania and of hostile intentions towards Greece. Since 1934, Greek generals and their staffs identified Italy as the most serious threat to Greek national security. Until today, the story of the strategic and tactical assessments of Italian intentions has been neglected by Greek academics and journalists. As the author argues, Greek officers had been preparing themselves mentally, psychologically and materially to counter Benito Mussolini's overwhelming military capabilities. The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 was not a surprise act of war but an anticipated hostile act that Greek strategists had forecasted. The head of the administration, Dictator Ioannis Metaxas trusted military intelligence and his chief of the Army General Staff, Major General Alexandros Papagos. However, Metaxas, despite intelligence to the contrary, chose not to call up the reservist forces Papagos had requested in the period of spring 1939- summer 1940. Metaxas was the one with access to all intelligence services but believed that a general mobilisation prior to the actual Italian attack could have serious diplomatic and financial repercussions for Greece and could have provoked Rome. In addition, Major General Papagos overestimated the Bulgarian military strategy against Greece until the eve of the Italian invasion. Eventually, signals intelligence provided the Greek side with tactical warning of an Italian attack from Albania. Especially, in the period 1938-1940 Greek officers held no illusions; sooner or later they would have to confront fascist Italy with their dated weapons, no fortifications and few men without the timely military aid of Great Britain or France.

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'Greek Military Intelligence and the Turkish Threat during the 1987 Aegean Crisis'

Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 25, May 2007.

The March 1987 Greek-Turkish crisis over the Aegean Sea continental shelf is considered, together with the January 1996 crisis on the sovereignty of the Imia Islets, the most serious incident in Greek-Turkish confrontations to date. Despite the conventional academic and media wisdom on the Turkish 'threat' during the 1987 crisis and successful Greek 'deterrence,' the author, citing key military intelligence and diplomatic officials, proves that Hellenic military intelligence assessed as low the Turkish operational military threat to the Greek armed forces in the Aegean. Surprisingly, while the Hellenic Navy mobilized the majority of the fleet, Ankara did not feel threatened by the possibility of a Greek military offensive. In response, the Turkish side used only aggressive rhetoric, but the Ankara generals decided against actual conflict with Athens. The author argues that since in 1987 there was no potential of a Greek-Turkish confrontation in the Aegean and no Turkish operational threat, the Greek show of force did not amount to deterrence. In order to deter a military threat there has to be aggressive military presence in time and place, not just boastful nationalistic rhetoric by the opponent.

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